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ABSTRACT. Fisheries worldwide are facing overexploitation, yet the social dimensions of fishers’ behavior remain under-studied, and
there is demand for an improved understanding of social processes that influence fisheries’ dynamics. Fishers draw on social relationships
to acquire information relating to fishing opportunities, contributing to knowledge that underpins decision making and behavior. In
this study we use quantitative social network analysis (SNA) to compare the structure of information-sharing networks and explore
links between information flow and fishing success at four ports in the Northumberland (UK) potting fishery. In our results we describe
the different information-sharing networks existing at each port, and show the following: a high proportion of fishers reported sharing
information, though fewer than a third of reported ties were reciprocated; subgroups existed in which greater information sharing
occurred; and networks displayed varying levels of cohesiveness. Fishers commonly shared information with others whom they perceived
to be successful, and reciprocal relationships were more common among fishers of similar success. Furthermore, fishers more central
in networks had more sources of incoming information through social relationships, shared information with fewer peers, and were
more successful than those who were less central. We conclude that engaging in information-sharing networks can provide benefits for
Northumberland fishers, although advantages gained through social networks may not be equally distributed. Although information-
sharing networks may contribute to fishing success, i.e., high lobster landings, these outcomes may not be compatible with long-term
fisheries management objectives. Nevertheless, understanding the social dynamics of information sharing can help inform management
strategies by identifying central fishers in information-sharing networks, who have access to a range of information on others’ fishing
behavior. Such fishers may be able to assist managers in collecting information on the distribution of fishing opportunities, the state
of the fishery, and the ways in which fishers use their knowledge to adapt to change and management interventions.
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INTRODUCTION
It is widely recognized that an inadequate understanding of
fishers’ behavior has contributed to failures of modern fisheries
management worldwide (Hilborn 1985, 2007). Fishers’ behavior
is influenced by many factors, including technological, ecological,
and economic variables, e.g., vessel power, target species
distribution, and markets. Underpinning fishers’ decision making
in the context of these variables is knowledge of the marine
environment (Johannes et al. 2000, Salas and Gaertner 2004,
Marchal et al. 2006, Grant and Berkes 2007). Decisions about
where to fish are informed by fishers’ knowledge, which helps
mitigate the uncertainty created by spatial and temporal variation
in target species (Cashdan 1983, Mangel and Clark 1983, Wilson
et al. 2007). 
Knowledge can be considered to be an individual or a social asset.
At an individual level, fishers accumulate a rich qualitative
knowledge through experience of fishing grounds over time
(Johannes et al. 2000). Differing experience means knowledge
may vary among individuals, influencing awareness of fishing
opportunities, behavior, and fishing success (Branch et al. 2006).
The view of knowledge as an individual asset is supported by
arguments proposing secrecy as a beneficial strategy in
competitive fisheries, where fishers conceal information about
their catches and fishing locations (Palsson 1982, Allen and
McGlade 1986, Palmer 1991). However, mounting evidence
suggests knowledge should be considered a social asset because,
despite competition, fishers engage in social relationships to share
information (Acheson 1981, Gatewood 1984, van Ginkel 2001,
Salas and Gaertner 2004, Mueller et al. 2008). Fishers draw on
social relationships to acquire information that contributes to
decisions about when and where to fish (Gezelius 2007). Such
relationships can increase fishing efficiency by reducing time spent
searching for productive grounds (Rudd 2003). Heterogeneity in
fishers’ decisions about whether to share information, and with
whom, mean that different fishers may have access to different
information.  
Although qualitative studies have emphasized the importance of
information flow, only recently have quantitative studies of
fishers’ behavior begun to incorporate social variables such as
information sharing (Allen and McGlade 1986, Little et al. 2004,
Little and McDonald 2007, Wilson et al. 2007, Wilson and Yan
2009), and the social dimensions of fishers’ behavior remain
under-studied (van Putten et al. 2012). Given the importance of
social relationships in acquiring information and building
knowledge, a social network approach is useful to explore the
dynamics of information sharing and how it relates to fishing
success. Social network analysis (SNA) provides a tool to examine
these theories empirically by quantifying properties of social
networks and the positions of individuals within them. SNA can
be defined as the study of social-relational systems comprising
data on a set of actors, their attributes, and the relationships
among them (Wasserman and Faust 1994). Social science research
has long employed SNA (van Duijn and Vermunt 2006, Borgatti
et al. 2009), and its potential to offer insight into network
properties with implications for natural resource management is
increasingly recognized (Bodin et al. 2006, Bodin and Prell 2011),
particularly in relation to fisheries governance (Maiolo and
Johnson 1989, Johnson and Orbach 1990, Crona and Bodin 2006,
1Centre for Resource Management and Environmental Studies, University of the West Indies, 2School of Marine Science and Technology, Newcastle
University, UK
Ecology and Society 19(2): 38
http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol19/iss2/art38/
Bodin and Crona 2008, Ramirez-Sanchez and Pinkerton 2009,
Hartley 2010, Hartley and Glass 2010, Marín and Berkes 2010,
Bodin and Prell 2011). However, the application of empirical
research and quantitative analysis to networks to date is limited
(Bodin and Crona 2009).  
In this study we contribute to the growing literature on SNA and
fisheries by exploring the relationship between information-
sharing networks and fishing success in the Northumberland
lobster fishery in the UK. We hypothesize that engaging in
information-sharing networks contributes to greater fishing
success because information relating to the fishing grounds and
catches of other vessels contributes to improved knowledge of
fishing opportunities. The Northumberland fishery provides an
opportunity to explore the value of information sharing in fishing
success, because the relatively low mobility of lobsters (Smith et
al. 2001) is expected to lead to knowledge of resource distribution
that is valuable to resource users for longer than in cases where
target species are more mobile (Acheson 1981, Palmer 1991). The
analysis of whole networks, including data on all individuals in a
network, can involve time-consuming data collection; therefore
the small population of resource users in Northumberland fishing
communities provides a feasible context for investigating these
links, using a whole-network approach. Our objectives are
described below.  
Objective 1: To describe and compare the network structure at
four ports in Northumberland, chosen for their diverse
characteristics. Structural properties of networks represent
underlying social processes among resource users, e.g.,
information sharing, the outcomes of which, e.g., fishing success,
can have implications for individuals within the network (Little
and McDonald 2007, Bodin and Crona 2009). We compare the
structure of the four networks at the four ports using four metrics
relevant to information sharing. First, we consider the number of
information-sharing ties reported, because it is expected that
highly connected networks should result in greater information
flow (Bodin and Crona 2009). Second, we measure reciprocity in
reported ties. Reciprocal ties are considered stronger than
asymmetric ties because reciprocity is believed to increase trust
and long-term obligations, which are important for information-
sharing relationships (Pretty 2003). Third, we consider network
fragmentation, because the extent to which subgroups occur and
the interaction between them can have implications for the flow
of information, and thus for the development of fishers’
knowledge (Crona and Bodin 2006, Bodin and Crona 2009).
Finally, we compare network centralization, which describes the
extent to which receipt of information, and therefore potential
competitive advantage, is dominated by a few individuals or
spread evenly among fishers.  
Objective 2: To understand patterns of relations among fishers.
Recent studies of farmers and fishers have found direction of
information flow to be important in social networks (Mueller et
al. 2008, Henrich and Broesch 2011, Van den Broeck and Dercon
2011). Fishers’ choices of whom to share information with are
expected to reflect their perceptions; those who are seeking to
learn preferentially connect to others who they anticipate possess
information that can be acquired (Henrich and Broesch 2011).
Our first hypothesis is that fishers are more likely to report
information-sharing ties with others whom they perceive to be
similarly successful or more successful than they are themselves.
Qualitative research suggests information-sharing relationships
occur among fishers who anticipate a reciprocal exchange of
information to be beneficial (Acheson 1988). Our second
hypothesis is therefore that reciprocal relationships are more likely
among fishers of similar success rates. 
Objective 3: To explore the relationship between fishing success
and fishers’ positions in a network. An individual’s position in a
network can confer opportunities or constraints (Bodin et al.
2006, Ernstson et al. 2008, Borgatti et al. 2009). Social capital
theory suggests that individuals with more social connections may
have access to broader knowledge and may perform better than
those with fewer ties (Crona and Bodin 2006, Carlsson and
Sandström 2008). Because information about where and when
others are successful can contribute to individuals’ knowledge of
fishing opportunities, our third hypothesis is that fishers who
receive information through a greater number of social ties will
be more successful.
METHODS
Study area
Geography and resources
The study area stretches from the River Tyne to the northern
boundary of Northumberland, where inshore fishing (to 6 nmi
[nautical miles] from the coast) is managed by the
Northumberland Inshore Fisheries and Conservation Authority
(NIFCA, Fig. 1). The potting fishery uses baited pots (traps/
creels) to target predominantly European lobster (Homarus
gammarus), brown crab (Cancer pagurus), and velvet swimming
crab (Necora puber). Lobster is distributed along the coast in rocky
substrata, from the shore to approximately 60 m depth (NIFCA
2013), and potting is geographically restricted by habitat
availability and potential conflict with trawling vessels offshore.
The extent of suitable habitat varies throughout the district, being
restricted to within 6 nmi in the south, and extending beyond 12
nmi further north.
Fig. 1. Map of the Northumberland Inshore Fisheries and
Conservation Authority (NIFCA) district and local shellfish
ports.
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Table 1. Summary of data collected and characteristics of fishers interviewed at each port. Estimated relational data lost was calculated
as 100 - k, where k is the sample size as a percentage of the population (Burt 1983). Data on fishers, gear, and vessels reflect characteristics
of the interview sample.
 Port and fisher characteristics Blyth Amble Seahouses Holy Island
Port characteristics
Population (2001 census) 35,691 6044 1803 162
Main fishing activities Potting,
trawling
Potting,
trawling
Potting Potting
Active fishers 11 17 9 6
Network data collected
Fishers providing network data (%) 10 (91) 16 (94) 9 (100) 6 (100)
Estimated relational data lost (%)
 
9 6 0 0
Fisher characteristics
Mean fisher age (SE) 47 (3) 52 (3) 42 (4) 56 (5)
Mean years fishing experience (SE) 23 (3) 29 (4) 25 (3) 40 (5)
Past generations fishing (% respondents) 5 (50) 13 (87) 9 (100) 6 (100)
Current family fishing (% respondents) 4 (40) 10 (63) 5 (56) 3 (50)
Other source of income (% respondents)
 
2 (20) 3 (20) 2 (22) 1 (17)
Fishing gear and vessels
Mean vessel length (m) (SE) 9.0 (0.56) 7.8 (0.47) 9.9 (0.35) 8.5 (0.51)
Mean engine size (kW) (SE) 106 (28) 56 (11) 187 (43) 119 (39)
Mean lobster pots (SE) 410 (60) 388 (55) 637 (74) 575 (101)
Mean months fishing per year (SE) 8.2 (0.5) 10.6 (1.2) 11.3 (0.7) 12.0 (<0.1)
Fishers using other fishing gear (%) 4 (40) 9 (56) 3 (33) 0 (0)
Fishing practices and markets
Lobster is a high-value species with market demand in mainland
Europe; in 2008, 132 potting vessels in the district landed 204
tonnes of lobster (UK Marine Management Organisation,
personal communication 2010). Lobster forms the most
economically valuable part of the catch, thus is preferentially
targeted by fishers, particularly during peak lobster season, July-
October. Potting vessels in the district are between 4 and 12 m in
length, and can work in excess of 2000 pots (NIFCA, personal
communication 2008). Outside peak lobster season, pots are often
deployed on different ground types to target other species (C. J.
Garside, P. M. Edward, and C. L. J. Frid, unpublished manuscript).
A number of vessels operate pots seasonally or part-time, together
with other fishing gear or occupations.
Fishing communities and site selection
Social characteristics vary among the 11 main ports within the
NIFCA district. Larger, more urban communities are generally
located in the south of the district and are home to trawl fleets in
addition to potting vessels. These fishing communities have
experienced some social stratification as seasonal and part-time
newcomers have entered the fishery, often with little or no fishing
background (local fishers, personal communication 2009). Many
smaller, more rural ports further north in the district are
considered to be more traditional and close-knit communities,
where fishing is commonly undertaken by generations of the same
families and forms a component of local tourism (NIFCA,
personal communication 2008). Data were collected at four ports
selected to obtain a geographic spread and capture a range of
port and fleet characteristics: Blyth, Amble, Seahouses, and Holy
Island (Fig. 1, Table 1).
Management challenges
Despite stocks of some shellfisheries being exploited beyond
recommended levels, e.g., lobster (CEFAS 2011) and crab (ICES
2012), limited management is in place for UK lobster fisheries,
and measures often are enforced under local bylaws. Although
lobster fishing has traditionally been a seasonal activity, increased
vessel and gear efficiency have led to a tendency for year-round
potting (Phillipson and Symes 2001). Anecdotal evidence of
increased fishing gear and investment in specialized potting
vessels have raised concerns about long-term sustainability of the
lobster fishery, leading to consideration of a rights-based
management system (Defra 2011). However, inshore fisheries are
not well studied at local levels, and data needed to inform
management measures are lacking, including information on the
allocation of inshore fishing activity (Defra 2010). The potential
for fishers’ knowledge to help build a more accurate picture of
fishing behavior and the biological resources, considered key to
achieving sustainable fisheries, is recognized by local managers
(Defra 2010; NIFCA, personal communication 2008).
Data collection
The target population was defined as skippers of active potting
vessels in the four ports, because preliminary interviews indicated
skippers made decisions about fishing locations. Fishing behavior
in Northumberland displays evidence of territoriality among
groups defined by their home port (Turner et al. 2013), thus each
port was considered to represent one social network. Attempts
were made to conduct semistructured interviews with all skippers
in each network to obtain data on whole networks. Forty-one
fishers were interviewed, representing over 90% of the target
population at each port (Table 1).  
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Information-sharing relationships were elicited by asking fishers
with which other fishing vessels or skippers they shared
information about fishing location or catch. Questions were
initially asked using a recall method, and respondents were
subsequently prompted using a list of active vessels from the
relevant port. Most respondents listed other skippers, though
some recalled ties by vessel name or occasionally by crew. We
assumed vessel crew possess similar information to skippers
regarding recent fishing trips, and that information is shared
between skipper and crew on the same vessel, therefore all
reported links between vessels were recorded as ties. These
information flows are interpreted as ties between fishers for the
following reasons: (1) the majority of interactions reported were
directly between skippers, (2) 40% of skippers work with no crew
thus any ties reported with these vessels equate to ties with
skippers, and (3) we assume that any information shared with
crew contributes to the knowledge base of skippers, who bear
ultimate responsibility for decisions about where to fish. 
Network links were based on perceived ongoing communication
patterns, and fishers were not asked to report frequencies of
interaction. Previous studies have found recollections of specific
interactions may not match observations of the same interactions,
but better reflect patterns of behavior over time (Freeman et al.
1987, Krackhardt 1987). Furthermore, perceptions of relations
may be more important in exploring behavior than observed
interactions (Borgatti et al. 2009), particularly in information-
sharing relationships, where degree of trust and quality of
information shared are not easily observable.  
Respondents were asked to name potting fishers they considered
to be successful, to obtain a metric of fishing success derived from
peer perceptions. The perceived success of individuals was
calculated as the percentage of their peers who named them as
successful. This metric was used as fishers’ perceptions of the
influence of others with whom they form relationships. Since
fishers preferentially target lobster, the validity of perceived
success as a metric was assessed through Spearman’s rank
correlation, using total lobster landings (t) of each interviewee
(where available, n = 35) in 2007; data were from NIFCA and the
UK Marine Management Organisation. Peer perceptions of
fishing success were positively correlated with fishers’ lobster
landings (rs = 0.659, p < 0.001), indicating that fishers’ perceptions
of success reflected high total catches.
Data analysis
Network structure
A relational matrix based on reported information-sharing ties
was analyzed using Ucinet (Borgatti et al. 2002). Recalled
relationships included a small number (four or fewer per port) of
ties outside the defined network boundaries, consistent with
previous research showing social-spatial groupings to be closely
related to fishers’ home port and gear type (St. Martin and Hall-
Arber 2008). Only ties between fishers within the network
boundaries were included in comparison of networks.  
Ties were dichotomous, indicating presence or absence of
information sharing, and were directed, indicating the direction
of reported information flow. One-way information flows were
possible; for example, fisher A may report sharing information
with fisher B without B sharing information with A. Ties between
nodes (fishers) were plotted in NetDraw (Borgatti 2002), using
a multidimensional scaling technique in which node position
depends on number of ties. Nodes with similar patterns of ties
are positioned close to each other (Scott 2000). 
The number of ties in each network is reported, together with
network density, which describes the ties reported as a
proportion of the possible ties within the network. Density is
dependent on network size, with larger networks tending to be
less dense, because the time and effort involved in social
relationships limits the maximum number of ties each actor can
maintain (Scott 2000). Given the small size of networks studied
here, we expect density to provide a comparable measure;
however, in addition we considered the mean number of ties per
node in each network. The proportion of reciprocal ties was also
calculated in each port. The number of components (subgroups
that are not connected to each other), and isolates (fishers who
were not connected to any others) were reported, to illustrate
network cohesion. The components reported are both weak
components, which take account of the presence or absence of
ties, and not of their directionality, and strong components,
which consider the directionality of ties between subgroups
(Scott 2000).  
Network centralization was calculated using individual in-
degree centrality scores (representing incoming information at
each node) to assess the distribution of information received by
fishers in the network (Freeman 1979). Network centralization
measures are based on a scale reflecting two opposing theoretical
positions: a network in which all actors are equally connected
(0.0), and one that is entirely centralized around one central node
(1.0). In a highly centralized network, in-centrality scores are
unevenly distributed, indicating that a small number of
individuals receive information from many others, whereas
others receive little information. Centralization scores were
interpreted in conjunction with network density to assess overall
network cohesion; in two networks with similar density, the one
with lower centralization can be considered more cohesive, with
more equal distribution of information among ties in the
network (Prell 2011).
Patterns of information-sharing relationships
Patterns of relationships were assessed using relational
contingency table analysis to test two hypotheses: (1) that fishers
were more likely to report sharing information with others who
were equally successful or more successful than themselves, and
(2) that reciprocal information-sharing relationships were more
likely to occur among fishers perceived to be successful than
between successful and unsuccessful fishers. Relational
contingency tables report the ratios of observed ties to those
expected by chance in a network with the same size and number
of ties. Significance values were calculated by comparing the
observed value to an underlying distribution estimated using a
randomization procedure (Borgatti et al. 2002).
Network position and fishing success
The relationship between fishing success and position in
information-sharing networks was assessed using degree
centrality (Freeman 1979). Centrality measures the extent to
which actors hold a central position in a network; high degree
centrality indicates that an actor has direct ties with many others
in the network (Wasserman and Faust 1994, Scott 2000). When
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Table 2. Summary of information-sharing networks reported in four ports. Components include more than one fisher; isolates are
fishers that are not connected to any others.
 Structural
properties
Measure Blyth Amble Seahouses Holy Island
Connectivity Total number of ties 22 33 12 17
Mean ties per fisher 2.0 1.9 1.3 2.8
Network density 0.22 0.13 0.17 0.57
Reciprocity Proportion of ties reciprocated 0.16 0.22 0.2 0.31
Components Weak components (isolates) 1 (0) 2 (1) 1 (2) 1 (0)
Strong components (isolates) 2 (4) 3 (5) 2 (2) 1 (0)
Centralization Centralization of in-centrality scores
(%)
0.33 0.20 0.52 0.28
applied to directed data, degree centrality comprises two parts:
for each fisher, out-degree centrality reflects the number of ties
reported by the fisher, i.e., representing information shared with
others, and in-degree centrality reflects ties reported by others, i.
e., incoming information to the fisher. Centrality measures were
normalized as a proportion of the maximum possible measure in
each network, to enable comparison of the four networks of
different sizes. Linear multiple regression, computed using
ordinary least squares, was used to assess relationships between
centrality measures and perceived success. Success was treated as
a dependent variable, and in-degree and out-degree centrality
were treated as predictor variables.
RESULTS
Network structure
We present sociograms to illustrate the structure of information-
sharing networks at each port and to visualize the level of
connectivity, reciprocity, fragmentation, and centralization in
each network (Fig. 2). Networks contained between 12 and 33
ties, and network density (the proportion of ties realized) was
lowest in Amble (0.13) and highest in Holy Island (0.57, Table 2).
Although Holy Island had the fewest fishers, the mean number
of incoming or outgoing ties per fisher was higher than in all other
ports (2.8 per fisher, Table 2). The proportion of ties reciprocated
was also highest in Holy Island (0.31, Table 2). Of fishers
interviewed, 81% reported sharing information with others, and
8 fishers reported not sharing any information. We identified a
total of three isolated nodes with no information-sharing
relationships (Fig. 2).  
Two weak components were evident in Amble (Fig. 2b), indicating
subgroups between which no information sharing occurred.
Every other network comprised a single weak component, in
which each fisher could reach every other by a direct or indirect
path (Fig. 2). When the direction of ties was taken into account,
two to three strong components plus a number of isolated nodes
were identified in each network except Holy Island, indicating
closer interactions within network subgroups (Table 2). When
only reciprocal ties were considered, the majority of fishers in all
ports except Holy Island were isolated, with a maximum of four
nodes in a single connected component (Fig. 2). All other
reciprocal relationships comprised single dyads or triads (Fig. 2).
Fig. 2. Social network diagrams showing information-sharing
ties in (a) Blyth, (b) Amble, (c) Seahouses, and (d) Holy Island.
Circles (nodes) represent fishers. Red circles represent fishers
interviewed; unshaded circles indicate fishers not interviewed.
Adjacent labels represent fisher identification numbers, and
circle size represents the number of times a fisher was named as
successful by peers. Arrows and lines indicate direction of
communication flow. Black lines indicate reciprocal flow; gray
lines indicate unreciprocated flow. Graph layout is based on
multidimensional scaling (MDS).
Network centralization was highest in Seahouses (0.52) and
lowest in Amble (0.20, Table 2). Centralization measures indicate
that access to information varies, and positional advantages
gained from information sharing are unequally distributed within
each port. In combination with density measurements,
centralization scores indicate that Holy Island was the most
cohesive network, with high density and low centralization. In
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contrast, Seahouses displayed low density and high
centralization, suggesting that it had the lowest levels of network
cohesion among the four ports (Table 2).
Patterns of information-sharing relationships
Relational contingency table analysis indicated that information-
sharing ties directed from unsuccessful to successful fishers and
between successful fishers were greater than expected by chance
at all ports, with statistically significant differences demonstrated
in Blyth and Amble (Table 3). In Seahouses all ties were less
frequent than expected by chance except those among successful
fishers. Information-sharing ties from successful to unsuccessful
fishers were lower than expected by chance in all ports. This was
supported by qualitative data; one fisher stated, “There’s no
malice in not sharing with some that aren’t very successful ... they
tend to just plod along and follow others, and they can’t teach
you anything.”
Table 3. Patterns of information-sharing between “successful” (S)
and “unsuccessful” (U) fishers. For example, S-U indicates
successful fishers sharing information with unsuccessful fishers.
Fishers denoted S are perceived as successful by at least one of
their peers. Numbers in cells represent the ratio of observed to
expected information-sharing ties. Values greater than 1 indicate
ties observed more frequently than expected. Significance values
are based on 1000 permutations.
 Port S-U U-U U-S S-S χ² Significance
Directed relationships
Blyth 0.42 0.80 1.46 3.33 9.61 0.047
Amble 0.25 0.60 1.50 3.02 23.52 0.004
Seahouses 0.60 0.00 0.90 2.10 6.60 0.150
Holy Island
 
0.59 1.18 1.18 1.18 1.24 1.000
Reciprocal relationships
Blyth 1.53 0.00 1.53 6.11 6.17 0.146
Amble 0.69 0.00 0.69 6.04 19.55 0.008
Seahouses 0.90 0.00 0.90 1.80 0.70 1.000
Holy Island 0.83 1.25 0.83 1.25 0.17 1.000
 
The number of reciprocal information-sharing ties between
successful fishers was greater than the number expected in all
ports, with statistically significant differences in the distribution
of ties in Amble and Blyth (Table 3). The most apparent
exceptions were the two most successful fishers in Blyth (Fig. 2a)
and Amble (Fig. 2b), who were frequently perceived as successful
but did not engage in any reciprocal information-sharing
relationships.
Network position and fishing success
Multiple regression showed a significant relationship between
perceived fishing success and centrality measures (F = 17.954, p 
< 0.001), although the fit explained a relatively small proportion
of the variation (R²adj = 0.446). Fishers with more incoming
information-sharing ties were likely to be more successful (β =
0.697, p < 0.001). Controlling for in-degree centrality, fishers with
more outgoing ties were likely to be less successful, though this
was not statistically significant at α = 0.05 (β = -0.297, p = 0.063).
DISCUSSION
Network structure
We found evidence of a high proportion of fishers engaging in
information-sharing networks at each port, suggesting that
sharing is perceived to be a useful strategy. These results are
consistent with a number of other studies that highlight the value
of social relationships for sharing information on fishing catch
and location (e.g., Palmer 1991, Gatewood 1984, Gezelius 2007,
Mueller et al. 2008). Three reasons may explain the lack of
information sharing among a minority of fishers (Gatewood
1984). First, fishers may lack the trust needed to establish
information-sharing relationships, particularly if  they are new to
the fishery. Second, fishers may have alternative information
sources; for example, in Northumberland former trawl fishers
maintain ties with other trawling vessels, and fishers mentioned
obtaining information from shellfish merchants. Third, fishing
success is associated with pride and prestige in the lobster fishery,
and some skippers may be unwilling to engage in information-
sharing relationships as they perceive it would indicate weakness;
one fisher stated, “If  you were a serious fisherman you wouldn’t
want to ask.” Pride and reputation may also have influenced some
fishers’ responses to interview questions, leading to an
underestimation of information-sharing relationships and
reciprocity. Although previous studies have identified a strong
norm of reciprocity in fishers’ information sharing (Gezelius
2007), a high proportion of relationships reported in
Northumberland were not reciprocated. This may reflect
unwillingness among some fishers to engage in, or admit to,
sharing information. 
We described four different network structures, reflecting the
diversity of fishing ports within the NIFCA district. The mean
number of ties, and mean number of reciprocal ties, held by each
fisher was highest in the smallest network, Holy Island, where
network density was highest. The fishing community in Holy
Island comprises fishers who are on average older and more
experienced, do not use any other fishing gear types aside from
pots, and have a family history of fishing (Table 1). These factors
may contribute to a long-standing network in which established
trust allows greater information sharing and reciprocity. In small
groups where trust is engendered by frequency of interaction
(Ostrom et al. 1999, Dietz et al. 2003), the transaction costs of
engaging in relationships may be lower, resulting in greater
interaction among individuals (Rudd 2000, 2003, Grafton 2005,
Sligo and Massey 2007). Greater numbers of ties in a network,
and higher overall cohesion demonstrated by high density and
low centralization, may influence information flow, indicating
potential for greater exposure to new information that can
contribute to knowledge (Bodin and Crona 2009). However,
where fishers are very highly connected there may also be greater
homogeneity of information received, and increasingly similar
knowledge of fishing grounds among fishers (Bodin and Crona
2009). Such homogeneity has the potential to reduce the efficiency
of resource use (Little and McDonald 2007) and reduce capacity
to adapt to change (Bodin and Norberg 2005). 
Subgroups can mitigate the potential negative effects of high
network connectivity by enabling the development of specialized
knowledge relating to fishing opportunities, thus a balance
between high connectivity and subgroups is considered beneficial
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(Bodin and Crona 2009). In all networks except Amble,
information-sharing networks formed a single weak component,
indicating that information flowed directly or indirectly among
all fishers. However, the number of strong components and
isolates increased with network size. In the ports of Amble and
Blyth, greater fragmentation and lower cohesion may be
explained by greater diversity among fishers, with more fishers
using multiple gear types and greater numbers of new entrants
without a family history of fishing (Table 1). In contrast, fishers
in Holy Island formed one strong component with no isolates,
consistent with high levels of trust and reciprocity in small
communities. The presence of strong components may also reflect
the nature of fishing opportunities. A study of Alaskan salmon
fishers speculated that size of information-sharing groups could
reflect the optimum number of vessels per fishing spot (Gatewood
1984). Because information sharing is assumed to result in
common knowledge regarding the location of target species and
other vessels, larger groups may lead to overcrowding as a result
of similar decision making, and may be detrimental to fishing
success (Gatewood 1984). Overcrowding is considered a problem
in Northumberland, particularly during peak season, when gear
entanglement and conflict over space can lead to negative impacts
on fishing efficiency. The presence of subgroups facilitating
information sharing among small groups may help mitigate these
problems.  
Of the four ports, centralization was highest in Blyth and
Seahouses, indicating that fishers had more similar ideas about
people they wished to share information with there. Fishers in
these ports were on average younger and less experienced (Table
1), and may have shared similar role models in the fishery.
However, the highest centralization score was 0.52 (Table 2),
indicating variation among fishers in who they decided to share
information with in all ports. This may reflect differing ideas about
which fishers were successful, or may reflect that tie formation
may also be affected by other factors, such as kinship (for example,
40% to 63% of fishers in each port had family members engaged
in the fishery, Table 1); age; spatial proximity; or similarity in
fishing patterns (Henrich and Broesch 2011). Nevertheless, ties
were not evenly distributed, indicating that receipt of information
differed among individuals in the network, and positional
advantages were therefore unequally distributed. Modeling work
has shown that differences in network structure may have
implications for resource exploitation patterns and efficiency; for
example, those with closer links to skilled individuals may achieve
greater success as a result of information flow (Little and
McDonald 2007). Empirical research into these issues would need
to distinguish such social effects from correlated effects; for
example, differences among networks may result from differences
in ecological variables or fishing practices (Conley and Udry
2010).
Patterns of information-sharing relationships
Our results support the hypothesis that fishers share information
with those perceived to be successful, supporting the contention
there are often leaders and followers in fishing communities (van
Ginkel 2001). The results suggest that links may be formed in
anticipation of receiving information from others (Conley and
Udry 2010). These results are consistent with previous studies that
found relationships between catch success and directionality of
information exchange; a study of Mexican fishers suggested that
less experienced fishers sought advice from those who were more
experienced (Ramirez-Sanchez 2011), and in the Lake Michigan
salmon fishery, fishers with below-average catch were observed
sharing information with more successful captains (Mueller et al.
2008).  
Modeling work suggests that some fishers (“cartesians,” risk-
avoiders who stick to fishing grounds with the best known return)
try to obtain information, but others (“stochasts,” risk-takers who
search for new productive grounds) try to avoid disclosing it (Allen
and McGlade 1986). Our findings support this argument, because
successful fishers were less likely to share information with
unsuccessful fishers. Reciprocal relationships were also more
common among successful fishers, supporting the contention that
fishers tend to share information with others of similar skill levels
(Acheson 1988). Similar findings have been identified in networks
among farmers, where “veteran farmers” were found to share
information more commonly than expected by chance (Conley
and Udry 2010). The differing distribution of ties by success level
was only statistically significant in Amble and Blyth, perhaps
because of the smaller size of networks in Seahouses and Holy
Island.  
Future research could explore the benefits that less successful
fishers perceive to gain from unreciprocated relationships with
successful fishers, and also could investigate how fishers respond
to any information they receive. For example, novice pineapple
farmers in Ghana were found to respond to information about
the outcome of using different fertilizer, particularly from more
experienced farmers (Conley and Udry 2010). Similar research in
a fisheries context would be useful to inform how social
interactions have implications for fishing behavior and
exploitation patterns, i.e., how fishers use the information they
receive to make decisions about where and when to fish. Although
this was not explored here, qualitative data indicated norms
associated with sharing information; information was shared only
with those trusted to use it considerately. One fisher stated: “Some
people I wouldn’t tell a thing to because they’d commandeer the
place and take it off  you.” Such norms attached to information
sharing are also found among farmers (Sligo and Massey 2007),
and support the view that shared information may be important
in long-term knowledge development. This is consistent with
studies suggesting that individuals use information accumulated
over long periods when deciding where and when to fish
(Mikkonen et al. 2008).
Network position and fishing success
Only a relatively small proportion of the variance in fishing
success was explained using centrality metrics. This is
unsurprising, because there are many other variables associated
with fisher characteristics and behavior that are likely to influence
success, e.g., target species composition, number of pots, vessel
size and engine power, and time spent fishing. However the results
indicate that fishers’ position in their information-sharing
network was related to their success. Fishing success was positively
related to in-centrality. Fishers with high numbers of incoming
ties may have greater access to information that can inform their
fishing decisions, contributing to improved knowledge of
resource distribution and increased fishing success. Similarly,
successful fishers in the Lake Michigan salmon fishery also had
more ties and more reciprocated ties than less successful fishers
Ecology and Society 19(2): 38
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(Mueller et al. 2008). Fishers with fewer incoming ties may receive
less incoming information, potentially resulting in greater
uncertainty in their decision making, contributing to lower
success. Perceived success was negatively related to out-centrality
(information shared with others), indicating that unsuccessful
fishers shared information with more of their peers than
successful fishers did. This is consistent with information-sharing
patterns identified, which suggest that unsuccessful fishers form
ties in anticipation of receiving information, but successful fishers
may benefit more from reciprocal ties with experienced
individuals. Although unsuccessful fishers may share with many
individuals, successful fishers may have greater incentives to be
secretive about good fishing grounds, allowing them to repeatedly
return without further competition (Acheson 1981).  
Although it is unclear whether fishers are successful because of
their centrality in networks, or whether success contributes to
their network position, there are likely to be iterative processes in
which networks are both explanatory and outcome variables
(Bodin and Crona 2011). Even though this study was not designed
to test this, we suggest that successful fishers are likely to benefit
from their position in the network. Whether or not successful
fishers benefit from information shared by unsuccessful fishers
depends on the quality of ties, including the salience and
credibility of information shared (Hartley 2010). Although
unsuccessful fishers may possess limited knowledge, they have an
incentive to share reliable information with those with whom they
seek to establish relationships. Recipients of information can
assess its quality both immediately and over time, and sharing
poor-quality information is likely to jeopardize chances of
establishing reciprocal relationships with successful fishers
(Mueller et al. 2008). Consequently, information received from
less-successful fishers may contribute to the knowledge base of
successful fishers.
CONCLUSION
Fisheries worldwide are facing challenges of overexploitation,
creating demand for an improved understanding of social
processes that influence fisheries dynamics (Crona and Hubacek
2010, van Putten et al. 2012). The UK shellfisheries sector has
been overlooked in terms of its management needs, thus the
results herein contribute to an improved understanding of fishers’
behavior in Northumberland. Results highlight the tangible value
social networks can play in supporting fishers’ livelihoods.
Information acquired can contribute to fishers’ accumulated
knowledge of the marine environment, aiding evaluation of
decisions about fishing behavior and potentially conferring a
comparative advantage (Holland and Sutinen 1999). However,
the varying centrality of individuals in the networks shows that
positional advantages gained through information sharing may
not be equally distributed.  
From a management perspective, the outcomes of information-
sharing networks may not be compatible with fisheries
management objectives. Although fishers equate high volumes of
lobster landings with success, fisheries management must take a
broader view that seeks to ensure long-term sustainability of
resource exploitation. Research on lobster fisheries throughout
the world illustrates how social adaptation and resilience may
translate into short-term success for fishers, but can mask
ecological feedbacks and potentially lead to increasing
vulnerability to change in social-ecological systems (Huitric 2005,
Steneck et al. 2011).  
Nevertheless, understanding the dynamics of information-
sharing networks can positively inform fisheries management, for
example by helping managers pinpoint individuals who could
help bridge information flows between fishers and managers.
Fishers who are central in information-sharing networks are
characterized by higher levels of fishing success and have access
to a wide range of information from their peers. Identifying these
fishers may be useful for managers seeking to collect information
about the spatial and temporal distribution of target species and
productive fishing grounds, the state of the fishery, and the ways
in which fishers use their experience and accumulated knowledge
to adapt to changes in the resource and the environment. Given
their access to a range of information on others’ fishing behavior,
central fishers may be able to assist managers in anticipating the
responses of the fishing community to change, and may help
managers design management interventions that are appropriate
to the social context.  
The network structures examined here related explicitly to
information sharing, but trust and social capital generated in such
networks may also encourage the flow of other information or
the development of norms and values (Bodin and Crona 2009,
Ramirez-Sanchez 2011). Further research could examine how the
structure and function of information-sharing networks may
facilitate the development of shared norms and may enhance
propensity for collective action (Rudd 2000, Pretty 2003, Ostrom
2009, Gutiérrez et al. 2011).
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